Issue link: http://dsnews.uberflip.com/i/1254476
88 Special Legal Report ACCELERATING THE JUDGEMENT OF MORTGAGE DEBT By Adam Gross, Stephen Vargas It is now clear that commencing a foreclosure and not entry of judgment accelerates mortgage debt. On February 18, 2020, New York's highest appellate court, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for permission to appeal the Bank of N.Y. v. Dieudonne's decision, which held acceleration of a New York mortgage occurs by filing a foreclosure action, not the Judgment of Foreclosure. Based on the denial, the "MacPherson/ reinstatement clause argument" is dead and can no longer be relied on. However, there is another case before the Court of Appeals regarding how a mortgage loan is accelerated, which should be decided this year. In Vargas v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, the Court of Appeals will decide whether a pre-foreclosure letter that contains the prescriptive language that the debt "will be accelerated" and "foreclosure proceedings will be initiated" if the default is not cured within the cure period constitutes a clear and unequivocal intent to accelerate the loan balance and begins running the six-year statute of limitations on the entire mortgage debt. Another issue before the Court of Appeals is whether a Plaintiff 's voluntary dismissal of a foreclosure is an affirmative act to revoke the acceleration that occurred when the foreclosure was commenced. ere are two pending cases, Freedom Mortgage Corp. v. Engel and Ditech Financial LLC v. Naidu, where the Court of Appeals will determine if a stipulation to voluntarily discontinue a foreclosure action entered within the six-year limitations period after acceleration is a revocation of the acceleration. To add to the lack of clarity, what is required in a deceleration letter is also not settled law. In Milone v. U.S. Bank N.A., the 2nd Dept. Appellate Court (where half of the population in New York resides) acknowledged acceleration can be revoked and stop the statute of limitations from running by a deceleration letter mailed within the six-year limitations period. However, the Milone Court went on to state that a deceleration letter would be invalid to revoke the acceleration if it does not contain the proper notification or is sent shortly before the statute of limitations expires. e court didn't clarify the exact language required in a deceleration letter or provide the time period for sending the letter, and there is no other appellate law that gives guidance regarding the content and timing of a deceleration letter. In stating what would be proper notification,