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39 » VISIT US ONLINE @ DSNEWS.COM NATIONAL THE "MEANINGFUL ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT" STANDARD By Brian P. Henry and Melissa Z. Prantzalos Why is the "meaningful attorney involvement" standard discussed in cases where a law firm collects a debt? In Bock v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, 30 F. Supp 3d 283 (D. N.J. 2014), the court held that a law firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by making an "implied representation that an attorney was meaning- fully involved in the preparation" of a collection complaint. e district court found an FDCPA violation because the attorney who reviewed the collection complaint did not spend enough time doing so. e court held that a collection com- plaint is "inherently" false and misleading, unless, at the time of signing it, the attorney "1) drafted, or carefully reviewed, the complaint; and 2) con- ducted an inquiry, reasonable under the circum- stances, sufficient to form a good faith belief that the claims and legal contentions in the complaint are supported by fact and warranted by law." e FDCPA does not specifically define or use the term "meaningful attorney involvement." However, section 1692e(3) of the FDCPA con- tains a simple prohibition that debt collectors may not make any "false representation or implica- tion that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney" [15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3)]. Over time, courts broadened the interpretation of section 1692e(3) to require that collection attorneys be "meaningfully involved" in the review of a consumer's file before sending a collection letter. [See, e.g., Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320-21 (Second Cir. 1993); Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 228-29 (Seventh Cir. 1996)]. Judicial and administrative decisions interpret- ing the meaningful involvement standard since Bock slowly stretched the language of section 1692e(3) into new directions [See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assoc, 165 F. Supp 3d 1330 (ND Ga. 2015— CFPB alleged that collection firm attorneys lacked personal knowledge of the facts in the affidavits used in pleadings to collect debts); Mohr v. Security Credit Servs, LLC, 141 F. Supp 3d 179 (NDNY 2015)—collection firm required to provide plaintiff with the names of the employees who prepared collection complaints]. ere are many examples of what is not "meaningful involvement" in judicial decisions, but no ruling provides any definitive standards or procedures that an attorney can follow in order to ensure compliance. Adding to the confusion, some courts have ruled that it is possible to "dis- claim" involvement in the preparation of collection letters and pleadings if the disclaimer satisfies certain criteria. [See Gonzales v. Kay 577 F.3d 600 (Fifth Cir. 2009); Jones v. Dufek, 830 F.3d 523 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Powell v. Aldous & Assocs., P.L.L.C., 2018 WL 278736 (D.N.J. 2018)]. At present, some appellate courts have ruled that foreclosing on a secured property interest is not covered by the FDCPA. Other courts reason that the FDCPA applies since the purpose of the foreclosure is to obtain repayment of a loan. In some states, the non-judicial process is an elected remedy that prevents the lender from seeking a deficiency judgment, while a judicial foreclosure allows for a monetary judgment and pursuit of a deficiency. Currently, there is much uncertainty regarding whether a non-judicial foreclosure is properly characterized as debt collection. To understand those decisions concluding that a non-judicial or quasi-judicial foreclosure is not the collection of a debt, please review Obdusky v. Fargo 879 F.3d (10th Cir. 2018) (attempting to enforce a security interest is not the same as collecting a debt); Ho v. ReconTrust Co. N.A. 858 F.3d 568, 573 (Ninth Cir. 2016) (entity does not become a debt collector if its only role in the debt collection process is the enforcement of a security interest; Speleos v. BAC Home Loan Servicing LP,

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